Abraham Kuyper, Conservatism, and Church and State, by Mark J. Larson. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2015, xii + 111 pages, $15.00, paper.

Interest in Abraham Kuyper is growing rapidly, and rightly so. Kuyper was a significant Christian political thinker, who established an influential Christian political party and served as Prime Minister of the Netherlands (1901–5). Now, just in time to stimulate our thinking during this 2016 election year, comes a notable contribution to Kuyperian scholarship by OPC minister Mark Larson. In his book, Larson connects Kuyper with traditional political conservatism.

Larson maintains that Kuyper provides a body of thought “of enduring value for the political engagement of the Christian community in our time” (xii). His introductory chapter (“Conservatism”) sets forth the intriguing and provocative thesis that Kuyper stands “in the trajectory of core conservative principles affirmed by Edmund Burke and more recently by Ronald Reagan” (2–3). Kuyper does so by affirming three foundational biblical principles that reflect “fundamental concerns of conservatism” (3–4, 12): the reality of natural law, the need for limited government, and the importance of personal freedom.

Larson begins chapter 2 (“God and Humanity”) by arguing that American conservatism emphasizes natural law as an enduring and objective moral order, ultimately grounded in belief in God, that maintains an essential role for religion in civil society (13). In a parallel fashion, Kuyper maintained that “the imprinting of this eternal law upon the mind of man” was necessary in the political life of the nation (16).

However, the reality of flawed humanity leads to a second core principle of conservatism, “the necessity of limited government due to the deep distrust of human nature” (17). Kuyper’s Calvinistic political philosophy rests not on some sense of human greatness, but on the reality of sin. Government restrains sin’s destructive power in the world (18–19), but the same sin that necessitates the formation of government also requires limiting it. Simply put, “Government is necessary because men are not angels, but men who are not angels run government” (20).

This leads Larson in his third chapter (“Limited Government”) to explore the need for governments to be constitutionally restrained. While both liberalism and socialism assume that the state is able to solve many if not most problems, conservatives stress that government, operated as it is by morally flawed individuals, must be restrained by limiting its role in society and by the application of constitutional safeguards.

Kuyper concurs. In his Lectures on Calvinism, Kuyper affirms his commitment to “a just constitution that restrains abuse of authority, sets limits, and offers the people a natural protection against lust for power and arbitrariness” (26). Kuyper’s affinity with the Tenth Amendment of the US Constitution can be noted in Article 10 of his Antirevolutionary Party platform of 1879, which affirmed the importance of a decentralized government (29).

Such decentralization is reinforced by Kuyper’s concept of sphere sovereignty.

While insisting that final authority rests firmly in God, Kuyper argues that the Lord has delegated authority to semi-autonomous societal spheres (such as family, business, church, science, art, agriculture, industry, education, journalism, labor, and government). The plurality of spheres resists any tendency of government to usurp all authority to itself. As Kuyper notes, “The state cannot legitimately assert its authority over against the father, nor a prince over against the rights of other governing bodies and the people within their spheres of competence” (31).

Sphere sovereignty, for Kuyper, also helps to protect religious liberty, a topic Larson addresses in chapter 4 (“Church and State”). Kuyper attempts to ground his commitment to religious liberty and church disestablishment in the writings of Calvin himself. Larson rightly points out that drawing a straight line of connection is problematic and argues a stronger continuity between Kuyper and the thought of James Madison, the principal architect of the First Amendment and the American constitutional tradition (45), “despite an element of continuity with Calvin’s teaching” (43).

In his fifth chapter (“Madisonian”), Larson outlines the shared principles between Kuyper and Madison on religion and politics, beginning with freedom of worship. Both men affirmed an “unalienable right” for every man to worship according to his own conscience. This distinguishes both Kuyper and Madison from Calvin, who asserted that government had an obligation to preserve and protect true religion (50). Kuyper and Madison also believed that all citizens should be treated equally before the law with regard to religion (50) since the state lacks jurisdiction in that area (51, 53). Kuyper insists the weapons waged against false religions by the church must be spiritual, not governmental (51), because “the government lacks the data of judgment” in matters of religious conviction (54). Indeed, the assumption of such jurisdiction by the state should be interpreted as despotism (54).

The two men also agree on disestablishment. Madison presented two arguments against establishment: First, the church did not need to be supported by taxes and actually prospered more when it received no government support (57). Kuyper agrees: “Churches flourish most richly when the government allows them to live from their own strength on the voluntary principle” (57). Second, says Madison, establishment tends to have a negative effect on the integrity of the church and its clergy and would likely encourage or require conformity (57–58). Kuyper concurs: “The separation of church and state . . . proceeds from . . . the realization that the well-being of the church and progress of Christianity demand it” (58). Larson finds it remarkable “that the head of a political party in another country appeals to the First Amendment of the American Constitution in support of his own program” (58).

Larson’s analysis that Kuyper’s political principles parallel those of traditional conservatism and that his position on religious liberty and disestablishment are rooted more in Madison than Calvin are worth the price of the book.

However, in his last two chapters Larson charts a different course. He wants to show that Kuyper’s “perspective on the church and social reformation stands in continuity with the Calvinist tradition” (59). In doing so he moves from analysis to targeted application. He is concerned to criticize the judicial tyranny of the US Supreme Court and to consider how the church ought to engage in resistance and reform in opposition to it.

Thus, in chapter six (“Tyranny”) Larson largely shifts his discussion from Calvin and Kuyper to the contemporary scene. Somewhat surprisingly (given his concern about establishment), Larson laments the Supreme Court’s erosion of the freedom of religion clause of the First Amendment by removing prayer, Bible reading, and the Ten Commandments from public schools (68). Unsurprisingly (given his concern about judicial activism), Larson also decries the rejection of strict constructionism and the setting aside of the Constitution in contemporary constitutional law, as in the egregious Roe v. Wade decision (69).

In mustering Calvinian forces against judicial activism, Larson cites Calvin’s powerful opposition to abortion, and records Calvin, Bullinger, and Bucer’s criticisms of incompetent or corrupt judges. However, it remains unclear how these critiques relate directly to current judicial activism, which is itself the misdirection of a constitutional form of government unknown to the magisterial Reformers. Allusions to Kuyper and Machen are closer to the mark, but even they could not have foreseen these developments. Larson’s concern is real enough, but his argument that opposition to judicial activism can be derived directly from Calvin and Kuyper needs strengthening.

Similarly, it is difficult to root Larson’s call in chapter 7 (“Resistance and Reform”) directly in the Calvinian tradition. Both Calvin and Kuyper saw the church’s response to tyranny as twofold: it should offer “an annihilating critique of sin in the state” and “instruct and exhort the state in the way of righteousness” (75). Further, Larson cites with approval John Murray’s caution that the church should not engage in politics but that church members must do so as citizens of the state (77), although there are times when the church has the obligation to condemn the failure of the civil magistrate to “exercise his God-given authority in the protection and promotion of the obligations, rights, and liberties” of its citizens (78). As an example of the latter, Larson applauds the efforts of the D. James Kennedy Center for Christian Statesmanship (78). Yet Larson’s discussion lacks specifics as to how ordinary Christians ought to be engaged in the labor of resistance and reform in the face of judicial activism beyond prayer, godly example, and voting (84–85).

Finally it is important to note that Kuyper’s Christian thought and activism defies easy categorization or labeling. Kuyper not only organized a Christian political party, he also advocated for Christian labor unions to address the plight of the worker and established two Christian newspapers to champion a Christian worldview in all areas of life, in addition to politics. It would be interesting to explore the relationship of these other activities to Kuyper’s political conservatism.

These last three paragraphs are not meant as criticisms, but simply suggestions for future research. In the present, Mark Larson has made a valuable contribution to Kuyperian scholarship by uncovering significant conservative roots to Kuyper’s political thought.

Douglas A. Felch is a minister in the Orthodox Presbyterian Church serving as professor of theological studies at Kuyper College in Grand Rapids, Michigan. Ordained Servant Online, March 2016.